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ABSTRACT
Digital Rights Management or DRM has been mainly used to provide access control protection for
multimedia products marketed to consumers, like music and movies. There are also a number of
DRM products, like Authentica and Microsoft’s RMS, that aim to protect documents for enterprises.
However, none of these products provide for all the needs of an enterprise, and furthermore these
products do not offer all the benefits that DRM potentially offers to an enterprise.
In this paper we discuss what DRM offers to enterprises, examine the base requirements for an en-
terprise DRM system and then analyse how well three existing enterprise DRM products satisfy the
requirements of an enterprise DRM system. We have found that enterprise DRM systems have yet to
mature with many requirements not satisfied.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, Apple Computers took three online publications, Powerpage, Apple Insider and Think Se-
cret, to court for publishing detailed details on new unannounced products [10]. The aim was to force
the publishers to reveal their sources on who leaked the information (and thus violated Apple’s non-
disclosure agreements). While this case was more interesting for the legal arguments on whether the
publications had to give up the identities of their sources, our focus is on the fact that Apple Comput-
ers, one of the major companies in the computer industry could not protect their trade secrets from
being distributed freely to unauthorised persons. Apple is not the only company with this problem – a
lot of confidential information leave the control of their owners on a regular basis, both willingly and
unwillingly, and there have been many estimates on the cost of intellectual property losses.
Traditionally, data has been encrypted and together with a limited release of keys, has been all that
companies have done (and have been able to do) to protect their confidential data. Traditional file
system protection (like restrictions of certain users to access certain files and directories) have been
used to complement the encrypted files. However, encryption is not really a complete solution. Using
the example of Apple Computers above, let us call the malicious employee Bill. From the information
in the press covering the court case [10], Bill is most likely to be a trusted employee who had complete
access to the confidential documents. Traditional encryption and access control mechanisms will not
prevent Bill from distributing the confidential documents – he needs only to decrypt the document
and then he can distribute it in any form he wants.
For these reasons, what is required is a mechanism that would allow the owner of the data to prescribe
the access control rules which will either work as prescribed, or not allow access at all. And while
access control rules are useful, it would be even better if the rules were more substantial than read,
modify and execute in addition to who gets these rules. More complex control rules like restrictions
on printing and excerption could be more useful.
Enterprise Digital Rights Management (E-DRM) products aim to provide such solutions. In this
paper, we discuss what are the requirements for an E-DRM system, which we have discussed with a
IT security manager of a South African subsidiary of a major international communication company.
We then review three major E-DRM products that available on the market, and analyse how well
they meet the requirements we discussed as well as what we consider the future for enterprise DRM
systems.
2 REQUIREMENTS
DRM has mainly been used by record companies to protect music sold on the Internet. Other ap-
plications of DRM such as securing e-books, have been less successful. The general requirements
for DRM in the enterprise are almost the same as the DRM employed in the consumer space, except
for the fact that enterprises do not need to cater for the flexibility required by consumers because
enterprises operate in a more closed environment.
Enterprises have the sole control on their intellectual property (which can range from patents to office
memos about Christmas parties), and can dictate the full range of rights they would like to prescribe
on their intellectual property (IP). Enterprises can also extend DRM to track and monitor the usage
of protected data without violating privacy laws. In this section, we present a set of requirements for
DRM in the enterprise, and give our motivation for these requirements.
Some of the requirements we present below have been presented before by Bartolini et al. [7], Park
et al. [12], Mulligan et al. [11] and Arnab et al. [6].
1. Persistent protection: A DRM system must guarantee the persistent protection of secured ob-
jects. This means that regardless of the location of the digital data 1, the access controls
that are imposed by the rights holder must either be enforced or the device should not be
able to read the file at all. If persistent failure is not achieved, the system can be considered
a failure.
2. Intercompany Transactions: Other than trading between themselves, modern companies also
outsource and enter into partnerships to create new products and services. These trans-
actions often involve confidentiality clauses, but as seen with the Apple case, it is very
difficult to enforce these clauses. An enterprise DRM system must be able to allow for
different companies to interact with each other without compromising security.
3. Portability: Portability can have a number of different meanings, and not all aspects of porta-
bility are equally important. We have divided portability into four categories, and discuss
them in increasing importance:
(a) Time Shifting: Time shifting refers to the ability of the user to access the work when
he or she wants to. While the freedom is critical in the consumer space, this is not
the same in an enterprise. In fact, it could be the case that access to protected data
in “odd” hours is indicative of misuse. Thus, the ability to thwart time shifting is
crucial in enterprises, and time shifting is not that important.
(b) Space Shifting: Space shifting refers to the ability of the user to freely access the
work in whichever device he or she wants. In most cases, enterprises would like
to restrict the number of devices that can access protected data, and thus space
shifting is not that important.
(c) Format Shifting: Referring to online music and video stores, Mulligan et al. argued
that format shifting is also an important portability issue [11]. Format shifting
allows the user to change the format of the data file (without necessarily affecting
the access control rules). Format shifting could be important in an enterprise for
a variety of reasons – for example, the enterprise could keep internal data stored
in a certain format and in a different format when released to other companies
or even to the public (in the case of financial statements for example). Format
shifting should also allow for easier integration between different applications
across different platforms.
(d) Platform Shifting: Platform shifting refers to the ability of the user to use different
operating systems and devices to access the protected data. In an enterprise, this
is probably the most important requirement. Even small businesses are likely to
make use of a multitude of different devices – PDA’s, desktop computers, lap-
tops and servers. Even if an enterprise decides to make use of one vendor for all
1This only applies to the digital format of the data. For example, for an electronic text file, the controls must apply
to the text and not to the paper copy if the text can be printed. This is an important distinction, as there will always be
analogue bypasses to DRM – for example taking photos with a camera when a screenshot is not allowed.
their devices (e.g. Linux or Microsoft), the devices are likely to run different ver-
sions of the operating system and applications and thus portability is extremely
important.
4. Excerpting: Excerption allows a user to take a certain segment of data from one source for
inclusion in another data file. Excerption is important in enterprises – not only to allow for
re-use of enterprise’s own IP, but also for assembling complex documents. For example,
financial statements of a company comprise of amongst other things, income statements,
director’s reports and auditor’s reports. Each of these documents are of different types and
have different authors and access control requirements. However the financial statements
are a complete package, and the different components must be put together, usually by
someone who is not an author of any of those documents. Thus DRM for enterprises need
to cater for excerption.
5. Integration with existing applications: Many enterprises use software developed for their
specific needs, and confidential documents and data are not necessarily generated by popu-
lar office applications such as Microsoft Office or Adobe Acrobat. Thus, integration with
existing applications would be a crucial deciding factor for selecting a particular DRM
solution.
6. Transfer of Rights: Employees in a company leave projects, move to different departments,
different branches and even leave the company. Similarly, IP of an enterprise also has
changes in control and could even be traded to other enterprises. For this reason there is a
need for DRM to allow for the transfer of rights between two parties. However, companies
also need to control the trade of their IP – employees should not be allowed to reveal trade
secrets to journalists for example as in the case cited in the introduction. Thus, together
with a mechanism to transfer rights, there must be mechanisms to control of who can ef-
fect a transfer of rights. Thus, the use of an authorised entity, or maybe a trusted third
party, is required to ensure that the transfer of rights is done legally and correctly.
Furthermore, because of the ease of replication of digital data, transfer of rights also means
that the protected data should not be accessible after the right has been transfered. Thus if
an employee leaves the company, he or she should not be able to access any IP owned by
the company without permission.
7. Allow for changes to access and usage rights after distribution: The initial rights assigned
to an employee might not be enough (because they are too restrictive for example) or
maybe more than necessary (because the employee was re-assigned to a different depart-
ment, for example). For this reason, DRM systems in an enterprise need to allow for
changes to access and usage rights after distribution of protected data.
8. Track usage of DRM works: Although not a feature of DRM itself, monitoring the access
and usage patterns of users can be easily achieved. The enterprise would of course like
to monitor the usage of confidential data, and should compromises to security take place,
access logs and usage patterns would be very useful in tracking down the source of the
compromise.
However, with the ability to track and monitor usage, privacy does become a concern.
Monitoring employee activity in the workplace is a contentious issue. This issue becomes
further clouded when considering the rights the employer has in monitoring employees of
company property.
9. Offline Usage: Communication networks are not perfect, and there are many situations where
an employee may not have access to the Internet (for example on a aeroplane). Thus
offline usage is desirable; but does have its drawbacks – offline usage reduces monitoring
and tracking capabilities; and also limits the control an enterprise has over its data. For
example, if an employee is fired and the employee has protected data that can be accessed
offline, the employee could still retain access to the protected data.
10. Easy identification: In [7], the authors identified the identification of digital works as a crucial
component of a DRM system. A DRM system must be able to uniquely identify digital
works on the Internet, and have a mechanism to correctly associate the users that have
rights to use/access the work as well as mechanisms to associate the right holders of the
work.
11. Easy Verification: Another criteria given by Bartolini et al. is to allow honest users to easily
prove that they have legitimate access to the protected work [7]. This extends in general
to all objects and transactions in a DRM system; integrity and verification should be easy
to prove.
In the next section we discuss three enterprise DRM systems, and then analyse how well they satisfy
the requirements we have just discussed.
3 ENTERPRISE DRM SYSTEMS
Unlike DRM systems for music and other multimedia, enterprise DRM systems are less publicized
and have lower media coverage. Despite this, there are a number of enterprise DRM systems in the
market most offering data protection targeted mostly for Microsoft Windows XP and 2000 operating
systems. In this section we discuss a few enterprise DRM system and how well they satisfy the
requirements we have just discussed. In each of the subsections, we give a small description of the
system and then examine how well each of the requirements are satisfied against a 3 point scale
developed by us:
0 : This requirement is not available at all.
1 : This requirement is technically met, but compromises security, or not a complete.
2 : This requirement is met, but can be improved upon.
3 : This requirement is completely supported.
A comparison between all the various systems is shown in table 1 in section 3.4.
3.1 Microsoft Rights Management Services (RMS)
Microsoft’s Rights Management Services (RMS) is promoted as a complete DRM system for enter-
prise deployment. RMS consists of server side Windows components for Windows Server 2003, as
well as client side components for Windows XP [1]. The client side component is a kernel module
that helps in enforcement of RMS usage rules but RMS does not offer complete operating system
enforcement, and requires applications to use RMS libraries to make use of RMS on the client side.
1. Persistent protection: When an RMS enabled document is created, the data is put in a crypto-
graphic envelope together with the use license [1]. As long as the cryptographic envelope
is not broken, the document is protected; and with the use of strong encryption, persistent
protection is achieved. As far as we are aware, there has also been no successful attacks
on RMS protection.
Rating: 3
2. Inter-company Transactions: All things considered, this is probably RMS’s biggest weak-
ness. By its design, RMS has two constraints for enabling inter-company transactions –
firstly, all machines that can handle RMS enabled documents first require to be a “trusted
entity” [1], a trusted machine part of the trusted network. Secondly, the default authenti-
cation mechanism for RMS is the company’s Microsoft Active Directory service. While
Microsoft Passport is also offered as an authentication mechanism, the company would
require to integrate the Microsoft Passport system with its own, and with Passport’s his-
tory of security failures, very few companies are willing to take this step [8].
Thus to enable inter-company transactions between two companies, the machines of both
companies need to be part of the same trusted network and the users of both companies
either need to have accounts in each other’s active directories or integrate Passport. Thus
inter-company transactions, though technically possible are very difficult to achieve and
insecure.
Rating: 1
3. Portability: As stated in the requirements, we shall examine each aspect of portability in turn:
(a) Time Shifting: RMS allows for the restrictions of when the user can access the doc-
ument and for how long.
Rating: 3
(b) Space Shifting: As discussed earlier, space shifting is limited by the insistence of
using trusted machines. In an intra-enterprise scenario this is perfect.
Rating: 2
(c) Format Shifting: RMS requires applications to be RMS enabled before RMS can be
used. With Microsoft Office 2003 being the only major application that is RMS
enabled, format shifting is really not available.
Rating: 2
item
Platform Shifting: In the client side, RMS is only available in full for Windows
XP. However many enterprises are still using older versions of Windows and
many also use other operating systems such as Linux and Mac OS. With RMS
unavailable for other operating systems and non Intel-X86 architectures, platform
shifting is impossible.
Rating: 0
4. Excerpting: Excerption is allowed as one of the use conditions.
Rating: 3
5. Integration with existing applications: Microsoft provides a development kit that allows for
applications to make use of RMS protection. This means that existing applications need
to be modified before they can have protection.
Rating: 2
6. Transfer of Rights: In RMS, “super users” are allowed to change the ownership of any RMS
enabled document. Super users are also allowed to add and remove other super users.
While not a perfect solution (a rogue super user could remove other super users and then
leave without a trace), it is a workable solution for most enterprises (for example, the CEO
or the major shareholder could be the super user).
Rating: 2
7. Allow for changes to access and usage rights after distribution: Its not possible in RMS, and
in fact the user scenarios in RMS explicitly shows that this is not possible [1].
Rating: 0
8. Track usage of DRM works: RMS allows for detailed logging of access and usage patterns.
Rating: 3
9. Offline Usage: As long as the machine is a trusted entity, and the use license does not require
online connectivity, RMS allows for offline usage.
Rating: 3
10. Easy identification: Identification of users is done using email addresses which are globally
unique. However, RMS enabled data itself does not have versioning control by default,
and thus there is no way to distinguish different versions of a document without opening
the document. This has potential for problems if an user is allowed to access one version
but excluded from the other version (for example the user is allowed to access version 1
but not version 2). If the use license is not forced to be renewed, then the user should be
able to continue accessing both versions.
Rating: 2
11. Easy Verification: Integrity and verification is easily provable in RMS.
Rating: 3
3.2 Authentica Enterprise Digital Rights Management Solutions
Authentica markets itself as the “leader in enterprise rights management (ERM) solutions” [4]. Their
two major products, Authentica Secure Office and PageRecall, are essentially patches for Microsoft
Office and Adobe PDF file format. Authentica’s enforcement level is at the application layer and
tightly integrated to the specific applications they support [9].
1. Persistent protection: As with RMS and other DRM products, when the protected document
is created, the data is put in a cryptographic envelope. As long as the cryptographic
envelope is not broken, the document is protected; and with the use of strong encryption,
persistent protection is achieved. As far as we are aware, there has also been no successful
attacks on Authentica’s products.
Rating: 3
2. Inter-company Transactions: Unlike RMS, Authentica supports a wider range of authentica-
tion protocols, and also has a simpler and more effective way of allowing external users
access. External users are still required to authenticate themselves to the creator of the
protected document, but this authentication does not have to be tightly integrated with the
company’s own user management systems.
Rating: 2
3. Portability: As stated in the requirements, we shall examine each aspect of portability in turn:
(a) Time Shifting: Authentica allows for the restrictions of when the user can access the
document and for how long.
Rating: 3
(b) Space Shifting: Unlike RMS, Authentica does not insist on the use of “trusted enti-
ties”, and thus space shifting is easier to achieve.
Rating: 3
(c) Format Shifting: Like RMS, documents protected by Authentica can only be opened
and used by applications that are supported by Authentica. With Microsoft Of-
fice and Adobe PDF being the only applications supported, there is very limited
scope for format shifting.
Rating: 1
(d) Platform Shifting: Similar to RMS, Authentica only supports Windows 2000 and
XP as the client operating system. However many enterprises are still using older
versions of Windows and many also use other operating systems such as Linux,
Mac OS and even embedded operating systems such as Palm OS and Windows
CE on PDAs. With Authentica’s DRM solutions unavailable for other operating
systems and non Intel-X86 architectures, platform shifting is impossible.
Rating: 0
4. Excerpting: Excerption is allowed as one of the use conditions.
Rating: 3
5. Integration with existing applications: Authentica’s system is only for specific applications
and not customizable.
Rating: 0
6. Transfer of Rights: As part of rights changes after distribution, Authentica allows for the
transfer of rights. However the mechanism is not detailed.
Rating: 3
7. Allow for changes to access and usage rights after distribution: Changes in rights are allowed
after distribution.
Rating: 3
8. Track usage of DRM works: Like RMS, Authentica’s E-DRM solutions offer very good us-
age tracking.
Rating: 3
9. Offline Usage: It is not clear if Authentica’s E-DRM solution requires authentication every
time the user accesses the document [9].
Rating: n/a
10. Easy identification: Like RMS, versioning support is not available by default, and thus there
is no way to distinguish different versions of a document without opening the document.
This has potential for problems if an user is allowed to access one version but excluded
from the other version (for example the user is allowed to access version 1 but not version
2). If the use license is not forced to be renewed, then the user should be able to continue
accessing both versions.
Rating: 2
11. Easy Verification: Integrity and verification are easily provable.
Rating: 3
3.3 Adobe LiveCycle & Adobe DRM
Adobe’s DRM system was one of the earliest implementations in the consumer space. Originally
(and still) used for Adobe’s eBook format, Adobe’s DRM system is now also available to enterprises.
However, unlike Authentica and Microsoft RMS, the main aim of Adobe’s DRM system is to protect
documents that are published in the PDF format instead of protecting the original format. Adobe’s
LiveCycle suite is a collection of programs that allow for the creation and management of protected
PDF files. The Adobe LiveCycle Document Security system is essentially a webservice that takes a
PDF file and encapsulates it in a cryptographic envelope designed for a specific recipient. The system
can also handle PDF forms [2]. The Adobe LiveCycle Policy Server allows for finer management of
the protected PDF files by adding functionality like document expiry dates and changing user rights
after distribution [5]. Protected PDF files can only be read by some versions of the Adobe Acrobat
Reader like versions 6.0 and later for Microsoft Windows XP and 2000. [3].
1. Persistent protection: Persistent protection is achieved, but as shown a few years ago, Adobe
DRM can be broken. However, Adobe has subsequently fixed the flaw and no further
attacks have taken place.
Rating: 3
2. Inter-company Transactions: Adobe’s system has a very fine control of users who can view
the protected documents. Thus not only are inter-company transactions enabled, but trans-
actions between the enterprise and any individual is also possible. [2]
Rating: 3
3. Portability: As stated in the requirements, we shall examine each aspect of portability in turn:
(a) Time Shifting: Adobe does support documents that expire after a limited time. [5]
Rating: 3
(b) Space Shifting: Space shifting is regulated by how the enterprise protects the doc-
uments. If the protection is done through the use of passwords, space shifting
is possible. However, if asymmetric encryption is used, space shifting does not
seem to be possible.
Rating: 2
(c) Format Shifting: Adobe’s DRM solution only works with Adobe PDF. [5]
Rating: 0
(d) Platform Shifting: Adobe’s PDF reader is available on a number of different operat-
ing systems including various versions of Windows, Linux, OS X and Palm OS.
Other operating systems are also supported but its unclear if these readers support
DRM enabled PDFs [3].
Rating: 3
4. Excerpting: Excerption is allowed as one of the conditions.
Rating: 3
5. Integration with existing applications: Adobe’s system allows for any data type to be con-
verted into protected PDF. However, the native data formats are not protected. This type
of protection does have value if it can be ensured that the native data files themselves are
not distributed.
Rating: 1
6. Transfer of Rights: LiveCycle creates documents on a per user basis [2], and thus transfer of
rights is not possible. However revocation is still possible [5].
Rating: 1
7. Allow for changes to access and usage rights after distribution: Changes in rights are allowed
after distribution.
Rating: 3
8. Track usage of DRM works: Tracking is supported, but the extent is not publicised as in the
case of RMS and Authentica.
Rating: 2
9. Offline Usage: Offline usage is supported in both protection modes.
Rating: 3
10. Easy identification: Versioning support is included and different versions will have different
identification mechanisms. We assume that the identifiers used are globally unique.
Rating: 3
11. Easy Verification: Integrity and verification are easily provable.
Rating: 3
3.4 Summary
A summary of the rating is given below:
Requirement RMS Authentica Adobe
01 Persistent Protections 3 3 3
02 Inter-company transactions 1 2 3
03 Portability: Time Shifting 3 3 3
04 Portability: Space Shifting 2 3 2
05 Portability: Format Shifting 2 1 0
06 Portability: Platform Shifting 0 0 3
07 Excerpting 3 3 3
08 Integration with existing applications 2 0 1
09 Transfer of Rights 2 3 1
10 Allow for changes to access and usage rights after dis-
tribution
0 3 3
11 Track usage of DRM works 3 3 2
12 Offline Usage 3 - 3
13 Easy identification 2 2 3
14 Easy Verification 3 3 3
Total (out of 42 assuming equal weighting) 29 29 33
Table 1: Requirement Analysis Scores of three enterprise DRM systems with equal weighting
3.5 Interpretation
Although we have measured each rating equally, most enterprises would value some requirements
more than others. Enterprises that run a single operating system for example (highly unlikely with the
spread of PDA’s) are going to value platform shifting less than other requirements. Thus the overall
score achieved by the three systems discussed will change dramatically when taking this into account.
In our opinion, we think the following requirements would be more valued by enterprises:
• Inter-company transactions
• Portability: Format Shifting
• Portability: Platform Shifting
• Integration with existing applications
• Transfer of rights
• Allow for changes to access and usage rights after distribution
• Offline usage
If we give the above requirements higher weighting, the results are more interesting as can be seen in
table 2. Authentica is no longer tied with RMS (and in fact falls behind), and Adobe retains its lead.
W Requirement RMS Authentica Adobe
01 1 Persistent Protections 3 3 3
02 2 Inter-company transactions 2 4 6
03 1 Portability: Time Shifting 3 3 3
04 1 Portability: Space Shifting 2 3 2
05 2 Portability: Format Shifting 4 2 0
06 2 Portability: Platform Shifting 0 0 6
07 1 Excerpting 3 3 3
08 2 Integration with existing applications 4 0 2
09 2 Transfer of Rights 4 6 2
10 2 Allow for changes to access and usage rights after dis-
tribution
0 6 6
11 1 Track usage of DRM works 3 3 2
12 2 Offline Usage 6 - 6
13 1 Easy identification 2 2 3
14 1 Easy Verification 3 3 3
Total (out of 63) 39 38 47
Table 2: Requirement Analysis Scores of three enterprise DRM systems with weighting
4 DISCUSSION
We have only reviewed three enterprise DRM systems, and while there are others, most of the other
systems offer similar functions as Authentica and are also essentially application patches like Authen-
tica. Thus, we expect their rating to be similar to Authentica’s rating.
As shown in tables 1 and 2, enterprise DRM systems have not fully matured yet. No DRM system can
offer both portability and support for a wide range of applications, and while Adobe’s system comes
close for providing great support, the system is only useful for protecting “published” documents and
not for documents that need to be edited frequently. For example if two companies wish to jointly bid
for a tender, employees of the respective companies need to collaborate to produce the bid document.
Adobe’s system is not going to be useful for this function and if the document needs to be produced
using applications other than Microsoft Office, RMS and Authentica would not work either.
As shown in tables 1 and 2, some requirements are not handled well in more than one DRM systems,
especially format and platform shifting. The list below looks at these requirements and some of the
reasons for this:
1. Inter-company Transactions: The main problem with Authentica and RMS is in the manner
they conduct user authentication. With RMS, enabling inter-company transactions leads
to possible general security issues with Microsoft Passport or requires integration with
the originating enterprise’s servers. Similarly, even though Authentica allows for a wider
range of authentication mechanisms, the end authentication is still controlled by the orig-
inating enterprise. Thus a problem in the originating enterprise (power failure, Internet
disconnection) would hamper the recipient.
2. Space Shifting: Space shifting is hampered by authentication mechanisms used by the DRM
system; and on an enterprise level, we do not consider space shifting to be a very important
requirement.
3. Format Shifting: In the case of RMS, it is currently a lack of applications using RMS (and Mi-
crosoft Office not supporting different formats) that hampers format shifting. Authentica
only caters for Microsoft Office, and thus does not support format shifting while Adobe’s
DRM system is tied in with the Adobe PDF format. We do not see this situation changing
in the near future.
4. Platform Shifting: Microsoft RMS and Authentica are centered around Microsoft Windows
XP only and thus do not lend itself for platform shifting.
5. Integration with existing applications: RMS and Authentica essentially require modification
of the existing applications to work while Adobe will work with any PDF file, but only
PDF files.
6. Easy Identification: We were surprised at the lack of version control in the systems. Identifi-
cation also has implications for portability and inter-company transactions.
In our opinion, Enterprise DRM systems must address all the requirements we have outlined before
being considered for mass roll out. Part of the problem in this regard is the lack of standards regarding
DRM package formats and protocols. We also support the view that application level DRM enforce-
ment (such as Authentica and Adobe) is only a temporary solution [13], and operating system and
ultimately hardware level enforcement are the only full solutions. In our current project, “Distributed
Componentised DRM System”, we aim to create a framework that caters for the requirements we
have outlined. The framework aims to separate the various players and functions of a DRM system
and then build up a system using the components (most of them being web services). We also have a
sub project that is investigating the effectiveness of kernel level DRM enforcement.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a set of requirements for enterprise DRM systems. We then analysed three
existing enterprise DRM systems on how well they satisfy these requirements. Unfortunately, even
though there is a clear need for enterprise DRM systems, none of the products examined are suitable
for mass deployment and use as standard security tools in enterprises.
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